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Abstract 
Much of the focus in the literature on participatory development has been on the 
demand side and on the extent to which citizens succeed in pressuring the state to 
deliver basic services. Less attention has been focused on the supply side of participatory 
development, namely on how state institutions give effect to development policies. Post-
Apartheid South Africa is replete with policies and legislation supporting participatory 
processes and yet in practice this has seldom lived up to the ideals espoused. This article 
examines the delivery of public housing in poor communities in three municipalities 
in South Africa and argues that there is a mismatch between how the formulators of 
policy understand participation and how it is interpreted by beneficiary communities and 
local officials. It concludes that considerably more attention needs to be focused on why 
officials fail to translate national policies into action if participatory democracy is to 
attain any legitimacy in the population at large. 
 
Points for practitioners 
Effective citizen engagement in decision-making processes is the key factor in 
participatory development programmes. Enabling legislation and policy is essential to 
the process but it is not sufficient to ensure participation. The design of participatory 
programmes will thus need to take into account the capacity of communities to organize 
themselves and will need to factor in the means and time to develop their ability to engage 
effectively. Officials managing participatory development projects need to undergo formal 
training so that they understand that the manner in which beneficiaries participate is as 
important the actual activities in which they are involved. 
 
Introduction 
The concept of participatory development, albeit propagated under diﬀerent labels, has a long 
history stretching back to the notions of self-rule and self-reliance advanced by colonial 
administrations in the 1940s and 1950s (Cooke, 2003). Although there were various 
attempts to popularize the idea of participation in the intervening years, the concept was 
only brought into the mainstream of developing thinking from the 1980s onwards as part 
of a neo-liberalist paradigm (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). The approach which, inter alia, 
envisaged a diminution of the state and strengthening the role of civil society was seen both 
as a means to empower ordinary citizens, and the poor in particular, and to promote more 




According to a World Bank resource book, ‘Participation is a process through which 
stakeholders inﬂuence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions 
and resources which aﬀect them’ (World Bank, 1998: 3). In this formulation, participatory 
development was seen to be inherently good in the potential it held to empower local 
communities and to promote greater eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness in the delivery of 
development programmes; for its advocates, furthermore, its virtues were perceived to be 
self-evident and incontestable. Despite the fact that participation was conceptually vague 
and ill-deﬁned (Kapoor, 2002; Lavigne Delville et al., 2005) and meant diﬀerent things 
to diﬀerent people, it was championed in certain political and academic circles (Burkey, 
1993; Chambers, 1995) and was rapidly absorbed into the orthodoxy of the development 
discourse espoused by multi-lateral and bilateral funding agencies (OECD, 1997; UNDP, 
1995; World Bank, 1998). 
 
However at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, a wave of revisionist writers severely 
criticized the concept on the grounds that it reduced the complex processes involved in poverty 
alleviation to a series of participatory methods and techniques which, once mastered, would 
facilitate eﬃcient and sustainable patterns of development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Goebbel, 1998). They also argued that the proponents of participatory government 
naively under-estimated the impacts of local power relations and the fact that the poorest 
of the poor were seldom the primary beneﬁciaries of participatory programmes which were 
frequently subject to capture by local elites (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). In that respect, 
Cleaver went so far as to state that ‘there is little evidence of the long-term eﬀectiveness 
of participation in materially improving the conditions of the most vulnerable people 
or as a strategy for change’ (Cleaver, 2001: 36). 
 
In defence of participation, subsequent writers have conceded that the attempts to 
depoliticize participatory development were ill-conceived, but they have argued that there 
remains considerable merit in involving communities in the planning and management of 
development initiatives. The process, according to Cornwall and Gaventa, involves ‘a shift 
in thinking from seeing people as ‘‘users’’ to a broader recognition of their rights and 
agency – including rights to information and to involvement in decision-making over 
issues with implications for resources’ (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001: 11). Beyond a 
simply tokenistic involvement of citizens in peripheral decisions, they argue, recognizing 
them as agents requires far-reaching changes in the way in which community 
participation is currently envisaged. 
 
In recognizing the political dimensions of development, the proponents of this approach 
have aligned the concept with the notion of participatory democracy which focuses, in 
the ﬁrst instance, on the attainment of basic human rights (Gaventa, 2004). Over the 
last two decades academic research has focused on the interplay between the realization of 
basic, or ﬁrst-order, rights and socioeconomic rights and entitlements as these are 
articulated as part of development policies in newly democratizing states (Mehta et al., 
2010). Much of the writing in this vein has looked at the ways in which citizens have 
mobilized to extract concessions from the state, and indeed there is consensus that 
mobilization in developing contexts is rather more frequently about socioeconomic rights, 




poor communities (Thompson and Tapscott, 2010). Research on community activism and 
participation has tended to look at the demand side of participatory democracy (that is on 
how citizens struggle to actualize their socioeconomic rights) and, by implication, the 
demand side of participatory development. While such work has provided valuable 
insights into the transformatory possibilities of participation, it has paid relatively little 
attention to the supply side of participatory development, that is on how or if the state, and 
particularly the local state, is able to give eﬀect to the precepts of participation even when 
this forms part of oﬃcial policy. 
 
The discussion which follows looks at eﬀorts to implement a policy of participatory 
housing delivery in post-Apartheid South Africa  and  argues that even in contexts where 
there is a political commitment to such a process, the engagement of citizens, and 
particularly of poor citizens, is considerably more challenging, from an administrative 
perspective, than policy makers might ever have envisaged. Over and above the vested 
interests of local elites, the vested interests of ordinary citizens, desperate for housing, 
pose additional challenges in identifying eligible candidates for state-sponsored housing 
projects. This is because their involvement in a housing project is generally driven less 
by a desire to beneﬁt the collective community than an individualistic  pursuit  to  
capture  resources  provided  by  the  state  (Be´  nit,  2002:   63; Emmet, 2000: 505). The  
extent  to  which  diﬀerent  communities  are  able   to mobilize and organize themselves 
to engage with the state, furthermore,   is shaped by their diﬀerent historical 
trajectories, social cohesion, and  socioeconomic standing. Relatedly, the diﬃculty of 
inter-governmental coordination in interpreting policy between diﬀerent levels of 
government together with limited administrative capacity has generally reduced the   
process to a bureaucratic exercise devoid of content for the intended   beneﬁciaries. 
Alternatively, the process of participation is often so protracted that citizens lose 
interest and faith in the idea of participation in  its entirety and resort to protest 
action.1 Under these circumstances there   appears  to  be  a  mismatch  between  the 
demand side of participatory housing delivery, what citizens expect, and the supply 
side, the policies and practices in place to ensure this delivery. 
 
The investigation looks at the attempts to implement a policy of participatory housing in 
three municipalities in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. In so doing, it considers 
the challenges faced by local authorities in delivering public housing in a participatory 
manner. These challenges relate to the design of participatory models (which fail to take into 
account the extent to which communities are able to mobilize towards a common goal), to 
the demands of citizens, and to the commitment of municipal oﬃcials to the process of 
participation. As a point of departure, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the form 
of the state and the policy framework which informs participatory development and the 
delivery of public housing in South Africa. 
 
The legislative and policy framework for participatory housing delivery 
Following the demise of white minority rule and the advent of democracy in 1994, the South 
African state was extensively reconﬁgured. Although retaining a three-tier system of 
government, based on national, provincial and local government, considerably more 
power was devolved to the nine provinces and 283 municipalities than in the past. However, 




this process, their capacity is highly variable in terms of both infrastructure and 
personnel. Further challenges exist in managing the concurrent responsibilities assumed by 
the diﬀerent levels of government (Tapscott, 2000). This state of aﬀairs has placed 
considerable pressure on the state, and particularly the local state, to deliver services to a 
citizenry with high expectations of both a greater say in decision-making and of 
substantively improved livelihoods. 
 
By its very nature, Apartheid rule represented the antithesis of participatory governance, 
and its racist and authoritarian mode of administration implied that the majority of South 
Africans had little or no say over policies which aﬀected their daily lives. Thus, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government, having 
swept into oﬃce on the tide of popular resistance in April 1994, should have brought 
the notion of participation into the mainstream of political thought and raised it to a ﬁrst 
principle of government policy. This is evident in the 1996 Constitution, which stipulates 
that ‘(p)eoples’ needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to 
participate in policy making’ (Republic of South Africa, 1996: sections 195 (1)e). The 
Constitution also stipulates that national legislation must ensure that these values and 
principles are promoted. To that end, a plethora of legislation has been enacted which 
explicitly charges diﬀerent state structures with responsibility for the promotion of 
citizens’ participation. Thus the 1997 White Paper on Transforming Public Service 
Delivery aimed to establish a framework for the delivery of public services which entailed 
listening to the views of citizens ‘and taking account of them in making decisions about 
what services should be provided . . .(as well as) treating them with consideration and 
respect’ (Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997: section 1.3.3). Building 
on this theme, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government stressed the need for local 
governments to ‘adopt inclusive approaches to fostering community participation, 
including strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the 
participation of marginalized groups in the local community’ (Department of 
Constitutional Development, 1998: section 1.3). 
 
The commitment to community participation was carried forward into the delivery of public 
housing. Recognizing the adverse impact of Apartheid on the settlement of the majority of 
South African citizens and mindful of the massive shortfall of urban accommodation, the 
incoming democratic government, from the outset, placed emphasis on the provision of 
housing as a basic human right. Thus the 1994 Housing White Paper asserted that the 
government was ‘under a duty to take steps and create conditions which will lead to an 
eﬀective right to housing for all . . . It is held that a person has a right to live in dignity, 
in habitable circumstances. Government therefore will vigorously promote an eﬀective 
right to housing for all, within the resource and other limitations applicable to it’ 
(Department of Housing, 1994: section 4.4.2). The principles enunciated in the White 
Paper were given legal eﬀect by the 1996 Constitution. Enshrined in the Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights is the declaration that ‘(e)veryone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing’ and furthermore that the ‘state must take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right’ (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996: section 26). Ensuing from this edict, a new National Housing Act was 
promulgated in 1997, committing the state, inter alia, to prioritize the needs of the poor in 





The 1997 National Housing Act asserts that national, provincial and local spheres of 
government must give priority to the needs of the poor and must consult meaningfully with 
individuals and communities aﬀected by housing development. The Act also dictates that the 
delivery of housing must be administered in a transparent and equitable manner (Republic 
of South Africa, 1997: section 2(1)). The currency of the Government’s commitment to 
consultation, public participation and transparency is further evident in the 2008 Social 
Housing Act which emphasizes the need to ‘consult with interested individuals, 
communities and ﬁnancial institutions in all phases of social housing development’. It 
also prescribes ‘the involvement of residents and key stakeholders through consultation, 
information sharing, education, training and skills transfer’ (Republic of South Africa, 
2008: section 4.4.4). 
 
However, while various legislative instruments and policy papers provide an enabling 
framework for the delivery of public housing, they do not specify precisely how this is to be 
achieved by the diﬀerent tiers of government. In the terms of the Constitution, as indicated, 
the delivery of housing is a concurrent responsibility of all three spheres of government. 
Following this model, the 1997 Housing Act assigns responsibility to the national 
government to determine provincial policy in respect of housing development. Thereafter, 
provincial governments must assume responsibility for promulgating legislation to ensure 
eﬀective housing delivery and must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to 
eﬀectively deliver public housing. In the ﬁnal instance, municipalities are charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring that housing is delivered within the policy framework. However, 
generally across all sectors, the alignment of policy between diﬀerent levels of 
government has proven to be a major challenge to the democratic state since its inception 
and this applies no less to the delivery of housing (Tapscott, 2000; Thompson and 
Nleya, 2010). 
 
The 2009 National Housing Code, prepared by the national Department of Human 
Settlements (formerly known as the Department of Housing), provides an outline of the 
measures to be followed in implementing the National Housing Act. The Code re-
emphasizes the need for the delivery of public housing to be ‘participatory and 
decentralised allowing eﬀective response to priorities and opportunities at the local level and 
enabling all role players to contribute their skills, labour, creativity, ﬁnancial and other 
resources to the housing process’ (Department of Human Settlements, 2009: section 
2.4.1). However, while national policy is explicit in its intent to advance community 
participation in local-level decision-making and particularly in the delivery of basic 
services, the administrative practicalities of doing so, the supply side, have seldom been 
made explicit. Still less attention has been given to the manner in which authorities should 
engage with large numbers of poor households in ways which are perceived to be 
transparent and legitimate. Finally, the drafters of policy gave little consideration to the 
widely diﬀering levels of administrative capacity extant in municipalities across the country. 
Thus, while some larger municipalities have the resources to engage with communities 
in a fairly meaningful fashion, others appear to be going through the motions, ensuring 
minimum levels of compliance with legislation and policy but without evidence of 





The case study which follows discusses the attempts to advance a policy of beneﬁciary 
participation in public housing allocation in ten projects in three municipalities in the 
Province of the Western Cape, namely metropolitan Cape Town, Drakenstein and George.2 
The municipalities were selected to reﬂect the experiences of large, medium and small 
municipalities in the delivery of public housing and to examine the ways in which national 
housing policy is diﬀerentially reﬂected at provincial and particularly at local 
implementation levels. Information derived from the ten projects has been aggregated 
into a single case which is discussed below. 
 
The mobilization of communities and establishment of beneficiary committees 
In delivering public housing projects and in giving eﬀect to the prescripts of national 
policy, a municipality is obligated to work with the representatives of   targeted 
communities through what are called ‘beneﬁciary committees’. The beneﬁciary committees 
are understood to be elected by community members who are to be the recipients of public 
housing. In implementing participatory development, furthermore, municipalities are 
obliged by the Housing Code to draw up a structured agreement (also referred to as a ‘social 
compact’) with a beneﬁciary committee prior to the roll-out of a housing project 
(Department of Human Settlements, 2009: Part 3, section 3.9: 30). While the drawing up 
of a social compact between a beneﬁciary committee and a municipality appears, at face 
value, to be a logical step in establishing a basis for community participation, the process is 
considerably more complex than its designers might have imagined. This is because the 
diﬀerent types of housing projects developed by municipalities present diﬀerent challenges in 
both identifying the most appropriate community-based partners and in selecting eligible 
beneﬁciaries in a fair and transparent manner. As will be discussed, the challenges in 
determining criteria for the selection of beneﬁciaries for an entirely new housing project, a 
greenﬁeld initiative, will diﬀer from those in the in situ upgrading of an informal 
settlement. 
 
In preparing a project for provincial government approval and funding, the Housing 
Code speciﬁes that a municipality must submit a copy of a social compact which reﬂects the 
agreement of beneﬁciary groups and other stakeholders in the community on a number of 
mutually identiﬁed key issues relating to the project. Among the issues to be considered 
are the following: the housing needs of the relevant community; the extent to which the 
housing project will meet the housing needs of an identiﬁed target market with particular 
reference to the appropriateness of the location, the number and type of residences to be 
constructed, the ﬁnish of the dwellings, the full cost to the beneﬁciary, and the level of 
services to be provided (Department of Human Settlements, 2009: Part 3, section F: 45). 
 
As the determination of norms and standards, in terms of the Housing Act, is the 
responsibility of provincial governments, the Code does not provide speciﬁc details on 
how the social compacts, should be drawn up. In other words, the framework for 
determining who should represent communities in drawing up social compacts, the 
content of the agreement and the expected roles of those involved is left to provincial 
governments to decide. In the Western Cape both provincial and local government 
oﬃcials who were interviewed reported that the provincial government had left 
responsibility to the municipalities to either draw up or delegate the drawing up of the 




implementation of participatory policies is left to the diﬀerential capacities of local housing 
oﬃcials. 
 
The selection of beneficiaries and appointment of beneficiary committees 
In terms of the Housing Code, as indicated, a municipality is expected to establish ways both 
to identify beneﬁciaries and to select a representative beneﬁciary committee. As there are 
diﬀerent policy issues to be addressed in delivering public housing to poor households 
(those who fall below a monthly income of R3500, roughly US$450), allocation schemes 
cannot perforce draw on one set of selection criteria. In the format envisaged in the policy, 
the beneﬁciary committees (as the legitimate representatives of a community) should assist 
municipalities in the selection of beneﬁciaries for a given project. However, in a context 
where there is huge demand for housing, such an arrangement was never entertained by 
any of the municipalities researched. This is because municipalities are expected to balance the 
demands of those on housing waiting lists with the often dire needs of vulnerable 
households (the disabled, aged, etc.) or those living in hazardous circumstances (such as 
on swampy ground or next to unguarded railway lines). 
 
These source area splits entail value judgements in the selection of beneﬁciaries which are 
often politically laden. While it has been possible to involve beneﬁciaries in the allocation 
process in a limited number of projects (for example, in selecting households to be moved 
in an in situ upgrading project), their input in selecting households for a greenﬁeld project, 
which draws potential beneﬁciaries from an entire municipality, as intimated, has proven 
to be problematic. It is evident from interviews with oﬃcials in all three municipalities that 
they fear that the vested interests and, as shall be seen, the sometimes questionable 
legitimacy, of beneﬁciary committee members, who are themselves generally seeking houses, 
would be such that they would override attempts to establish objective selection criteria. 
As a consequence, municipalities have made use of the waiting lists (selecting those 
waiting longest and who pass a means test) and have also reserved a proportion of houses 
for the severely disadvantaged (on criteria which have been determined by municipal 
councils). 
 
From the above it is clear that the actual selection of beneﬁciaries is largely completed 
before the setting up of beneﬁciary committees (although practice diﬀers from project to 
project) and these bodies do not have a direct say in selecting who is to receive housing. In 
some cases, as occurred for example in Project 59 in the Drakenstein municipality, a 
community did aggressively, and eﬀectively, pressure the local authority to eﬀect a diﬀerent 
system of allocation. This occurred when the residents of two informal settlements 
(Fairylands and Siyahlala) resorted to protest marches to compel the municipality to change 
the formal allocation from an 80:20 split between the waiting list and council tenants to a 
50:50 split between the two informal settlements.4 This form of engagement, however, 
proved to be the exception rather than the rule and indicates that to be heard, the 
community had to exercise their rights outside of the formally constituted channels for 
communication with the municipality. It also does not constitute an example of best practice 
as the municipality, rather than adhering to a broader and more inclusive process of 






It was evident from interviews across all three municipalities that participation by the 
community as a whole is restricted to attendance at a public meeting at which 
beneﬁciaries (selected by the municipality) are invited to elect a beneﬁciary committee. 
Once the beneﬁciary committee has been elected, its role is to liaise with the community. In 
most cases the beneﬁciary representatives will also liaise with the project developer about the 
types of house to be built as well the choice of possible ﬁnishes. In general, however, they 
exercise no oversight role when it comes to the construction of housing units and they serve 
mostly as a medium of communication between the municipality, the developer and the 
community. In addition, municipalities typically establish Project Steering Committees 
(PSCs) as the key deliberative body on a housing project, and these comprise 
representatives from local government, local councillors, representatives of the housing 
developer (where one has been appointed), together with representatives from the beneﬁciary 
committees. The beneﬁciary representatives consequently have a minority voice in the 
PSCs which, in any event, generally deal with the technical details of the construction 
process. 
 
The limits to community mobilization 
Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of the current system of participatory housing is 
the broad assumption that there is a level of homogeneity in the way that diﬀerent 
communities, with widely diﬀerent historical trajectories, are able to mobilize towards a 
common purpose. Apartheid rule, in its intent and practice, served to divide and rule 
according to race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status and place of birth (black people born in 
the rural areas were consigned to live there). The histories of social mobilization both 
against Apartheid rule and for access to services denied them consequently diﬀers 
signiﬁcantly from community to community. In some communities, such as those of African 
people who migrated in from the rural areas some 20 years ago and who now reside in the 
sprawling informal settlement of Khayelitsha on the margins of metropolitan Cape Town, 
there is a strong tradition of community organization and residents are accustomed to 
electing representatives to street committees, ward committees and the like.5 Through 
these organizations, furthermore, community leaders are better known to residents and their 
standing appears to be respected. In this context, there are regular report back meetings and 
greater trust of the decisions made on their behalf by the beneﬁciary committees 
(Thompson and Nleya, 2010). 
 
In communities which have been relatively recently formed or which include long-settled 
residents together with others who have been more recently re-settled in the area, the 
establishment of coherent beneﬁciary committees is problematic. Thus, in the case of 
Drommedaris and Bardale in Cape Town, which are emergency settlement projects, 
residents, although of the same ethnicity, are drawn from diﬀerent geographical 
locations. In both settlements the beneﬁciary committees are divided and meet separately 
in their own communities, and sometimes separately with the municipal authorities, even 
though they are encouraged to form one entity.6 In this context, the feedback to 
communities is somewhat erratic and it is often left to municipal oﬃcials to provide 
details on the housing projects. 
 
In communities such as Belhar, another Cape Town settlement, where there has been little 




legitimacy. This is because those appointed as representatives often have no standing in 
the community and have been elected by acclamation on the basis of a nomination at the 
ﬁrst public meeting of beneﬁciaries. Lacking a formal mandate from the community (and 
hence an obligation to take their position seriously), these representatives participate 
erratically in beneﬁciary committee meetings and many drop out entirely. It is also evident 
that their feedback to their constituencies is limited or non-existent.7 
 
The legitimacy of beneﬁciary committees is also inﬂuenced by the type of housing project 
which they are expected to represent. In the case of in situ upgrading schemes, where 
housing is constructed for an entire community, beneﬁciaries are more likely to know the 
individuals whom they elect to a committee. They are also more likely to accept the decisions 
reached by their representatives on the project steering committee. In projects which 
recruit people living close to a new housing development, the process is not as 
straightforward but the prospect exists for some form of locality, if not community, identity 
which will facilitate the election of a beneﬁciary committee which is accepted as legitimate 
by the community. In the case of greenﬁeld projects, as indicated, the process of electing a 
representative beneﬁciary committee is especially challenging. This is because 
beneﬁciaries are not known to each other, they have no history of collaboration and trust 
levels between them are low.8 
 
There is also some evidence to show that community leadership can be patriarchal in its 
orientation and exclude women from participatory processes. In the case of Drakenstein’s 
Project 59, Phase 7, the community leaders decided on a ‘meeting of the men’ with the 
municipality because, as one of the male beneﬁciary representatives informants stated, 
‘women are noisy and disruptive, they don’t know what they want’. While the women 
representatives in the focus group meeting disagreed with him, they were unwilling to 
elaborate their concerns past mentioning that the needs of vulnerable groups and other 
community needs (such as the location of crèches) had not been prioritized in the 
allocation of houses as  they would have wished.9 
 
A further factor undermining the legitimacy of beneﬁciary committees has been their 
relation to PSCs. In cases where a beneﬁciary committee has been conﬂated with a PSC or is 
eﬀectively incorporated into one, beneﬁciary committees appear to serve little purpose and 
they are largely ignored by beneﬁciary communities. This is because they are seen as merely 
the conduits for decisions taken by the PSC and, by inference, the municipality. 
 
The appointment of Community Liaison Oﬃcers (CLOs) by the project devel- opers as 
intermediaries is a further factor which undermines the legitimacy of beneﬁciary 
committees. Not only are these CLOs paid for their services (a source of contention in that 
they are sometimes also beneﬁciaries themselves), but they have the time to interact with 
beneﬁciary communities in ways which beneﬁciary committee members do not. In such 
circumstances, both municipal oﬃcials and the developers frequently bypass beneﬁciary 
committee members in their dealings with the community and, in the process, diminish 
their standing in the public eye.10 Where beneﬁciary committees are seen by their 
communities to be largely powerless in their dealings with oﬃcials and when they have 
little to show for their engagement with PSCs, their legitimacy is likely to be limited. A 




process of beneﬁciary selection, the relocation of households, etc. Conversely, where there 
is a legitimate and active beneﬁciary committee in place, there is greater acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the housing allocation process. The uneven and place-speciﬁc capacity of 
communities to mobilize and coordinate their activities thus plays a pivotal role in the 
manner in which they ‘interpret, interface with and access state-run urban reconstruction 
projects such as housing provision’ (Oldﬁeld, 2000: 859). 
 
The limits to voluntarism 
The functioning of the beneﬁciary committees also points to the limitations of 
voluntarism in supporting the process of participation. Municipal oﬃcials expressed 
their disappointment that many beneﬁciary committees only lasted until such time as 
their members had received houses, following which they dissolved. As a consequence, 
there was insuﬃcient community input in subsequent phases of a housing project, 
including the construction of clinics, crèches and other public facilities. This state of aﬀairs 
is unsurprising, however, because of the ten projects examined, the average time period 
between selection and delivery of houses was a minimum of three years and in some 
cases as long as ﬁve to seven years.11 Delays of this duration place beneﬁciary 
representatives in an untenable position and in many cases ensure that they are not willing 
to volunteer for future leadership roles. As one former member of a beneﬁciary committee 
in Drakenstein stated, ‘when we have our houses we need money for them and our 
families, we don’t want to spend more time on this (lobbying the municipality)’.12 
 
In focus group and individual interviews with beneﬁciary committee members it was evident 
that their role as community representatives and as members of the PSC is a largely 
thankless one. They are not compensated for their time or eﬀort in liaising with the 
communities they are elected to serve, and have to rely heavily on the municipality to be 
able to communicate with their constituencies on issues discussed in the PSC. It is also 
clear that in most cases they are the bearers of bad news, having to communicate endless 
time delays in the delivery of housing. They also have to mediate in the diﬃcult task of 
deciding who does not get houses (for example, where it is not possible to accommodate 
all households in an informal settlement upgrading project). Lacking any training in 
the process, most of the beneﬁciary representatives felt they did not have suﬃcient 
knowledge or understanding of the allocation process from selection to the completion 
of the project, as information appeared to be conveyed to them on a need-to-know basis. 
 
The limits of official understanding of participation 
The election of a representative committee in a community that has no history of social 
mobilization or sense of common identity, as indicated, is likely to be challenging under the 
best of circumstances. In contexts where oﬃcials and communities lack an understanding 
of the intent of participation, however, the outcome is likely to be a bureaucratic exercise 
conducted under suﬀerance. Where community participation is not understood by oﬃcials 
to have any intrinsic value, they will quickly interpret it in narrow instrumental terms. 
While the intent of legislation and policy, and indeed of senior oﬃcials in government, 
might well be to engage civil society more actively in development processes, this view is 
frequently not understood or shared by lower-level bureaucrats particularly at the municipal 
level. As Manor explains, ‘Low-level bureaucrats see a more assertive civil society as a 




associations and user committees by employing methods that co-opt these committees so 
that their control of development processes survives’ (Manor, 2004: 204). In the case 
study it was evident that the understandings of lower-level municipal bureaucrats of the 
role of beneﬁciary committees diﬀered from those held at other tiers of government. Most 
viewed these structures largely as vehicles for the transmission of information (and 
decisions) about a housing project to beneﬁciary communities. The project developers, 
likewise, viewed the committees largely in instrumental terms as assisting in the roll-out of 
the housing project, after beneﬁciaries had been selected by the municipality concerned. As 
a consultant to one project put it, beneﬁciary committees were expected to be the ‘eyes 
and ears of the municipality on the ground’ with the assigned task to ensure that a project is 
implemented smoothly.13 
 
Pressures to roll out housing programmes are such that oﬃcials and the developers they 
have contracted frequently simplify complex social processes and pursue shortcuts in their 
attempts to mobilize communities. These shortcuts might entail attempts to co-opt 
community representatives (by selecting those that are likely to be most compliant), to limit 
their role in decision-making processes (for example, by ensuring that they have a minority 
vote on project steering committees), or to side-step them entirely in their dealings with 
beneﬁciary communities (by making use of CLOs). As Cleaver points out, from the 
perspective of housing developers and the oﬃcials who commission them, there is an 
inherent diﬃculty in incorporating project concerns with participatory discourses. For 
those implementing a project, it is ‘by deﬁnition, a clearly deﬁned set of activities, 
concerned with quantiﬁable costs and beneﬁts, with time-limited activities and budgets. 
The project imperative emphasizes meeting practical rather than strategic needs, 
instrumentality rather than empowerment’ (Cleaver, 1999: 598). 
 
A lack of oﬃcial understanding of the process of participation was also evident in the 
approach adopted by municipal oﬃcials in the drafting of social compacts with community 
representatives. All three municipalities had drawn up templates for social compacts but these 
were generic documents which provide little scope for real community engagement on the 
terms of the agreement. This lack of appreciation of the objectives of participation is 
evident in the actual design of the compacts which provide little space for addenda or other 
inputs from the beneﬁciary committees. In other words, beneﬁciary committees are 
expected to sign oﬀ an agreement predetermined by the municipality. In all three 
municipalities the social compacts were in English despite the fact that the vast 
majority of the inhabitants were Afrikaans or Xhosa speaking with relatively low levels of 
education.14 A project developer interviewed on this issue stated that the social compacts 
were a waste of time because the beneﬁciary committees understood neither their content 
nor their purpose.15 
 
The net eﬀect of this state of aﬀairs is that the signing of a social compact is largely a 
bureaucratic paper exercise which is presented to beneﬁciaries as a necessary step to secure 
the release of funds from the provincial government for commencement of a project. It 
also does not appear as if the compacts are subject to any review or scrutiny by the 
Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing once they are received. As a 




word and it would appear that neither municipal oﬃcials nor beneﬁciaries considered 
them to be of any signiﬁcance in ensuring accountability on the part of either party. 
 
Conclusion 
This research on participation in public housing development in the Western Cape Province 
of South Africa illustrates the disjuncture that can occur between the supply and demand 
sides of participatory development. The demand for housing as a basic right of citizenship 
is, as indicated, high and manifests itself in frequent public protest by the poor against the 
state’s failure to deliver houses. The state’s commitment to supply public housing in a 
participatory way, likewise, is evident, at least formalistically, in an array of policies and 
legislative measures. Notwithstanding the latent potential for a convergence of these 
forces of supply and demand, it is clear that the practice of participatory development 
remains some distance from the ideals enunciated in policy instruments. In particular, it is 
apparent that the aspirations of policy formulators exceed both the administrative capacity 
of municipal oﬃcials and the potential of communities to mobilize. 
 
From the supply side, over and above the challenges of inter-governmental coordination, 
it is evident that there were diﬀering understandings of the meaning and intent of 
participatory processes among diﬀerent role players. For most municipal oﬃcials and 
developers, beneﬁciary participation was viewed as a means to an end (the expeditious 
delivery of houses) rather than as a simultaneous process of promoting a community’s 
capacity to inﬂuence the manner in which state services are delivered (Lemanski, 2008: 
395). In this context, the involvement of communities was frequently seen to be a time-
consuming and frustrating process which they sought to circumvent wherever possible. 
Even in terms of the limited role assigned to beneﬁciary committees in implementation, the 
situation was aggravated by the fact that information and power asymmetries exist between 
municipal oﬃcials and community members. Communities are frequently unaware of 
their entitlements and of the options available to them, for example, in the construction of 
diﬀerent housing types. The notion of a partnership between state and community thus 
remains purely rhetorical, and although the social compacts are intended to commit both 
parties to fulﬁl certain obligations, in practice there is little recourse on the part of either if 
there is a failure of compliance. For communities, in particular, delays by municipalities in 
the roll-out of housing represent an egregious breach of contract and yet they are powerless 
to hold them to account. 
 
The presumption by oﬃcials that all communities in a municipality are equally capable of 
organizing themselves towards a common cause and that there is a tradition of 
voluntarism suﬃcient within them to sustain this is illustrative of a superﬁcial grasp (or a 
disinterest) in the complex social dynamics that make up all communities irrespective of 
their socioeconomic character. Yet, the ﬁndings of this research conﬁrm the view advanced 
by da Cunha and Pena that participation ‘works for groups that are already able to help 
themselves .. .’ and furthermore, that it works well ‘only when the institutions of 
participation are in place before the need they address arises and when the institutions are 
compatible with its objectives’ (Da Cunha and Pena, 1997: 20). 
 
While the research conducted for this article suggests that participatory development in 




evident that the supply side of the approach has potential provided there is more 
realism about its prospects and the manner in which it is pursued. From the perspective of 
inter-governmental relations, it is important that provincial governments recognize the 
varied capacity of municipalities under their aegis and address these asymmetries by setting 
down norms and standards for the selection of beneﬁciaries in diﬀerent housing project 
types and for interaction with beneﬁciary committees. In that respect, it is also important 
that municipal oﬃcials recognize the limits of voluntarism and provide a small stipend to 
members of beneﬁciary committees and, at the same time, provide them with the training 
necessary to carry out their roles eﬀectively. 
 
It is also essential that municipal oﬃcials managing housing projects undergo formal 
training so that they understand participatory development as both product and process. In 
other words, it is understood that the way in which beneﬁciaries participate is as 
important for the success of public housing programmes as the actual construction of 
dwellings. Implicit in such an exercise is the need for municipal oﬃcials to understand that 
citizen participation constitutes a basic democratic right, embedded in the constitution and 
in a succession of legislative and policy instruments, and that the state is beholden to make 
this process meaningful. 
 
The importance of factoring in the time and resource costs of participation will also need to 
be instilled into oﬃcial thinking and included in the tender speciﬁcations set out for housing 
developers. In other words, the time necessary to interact with communities and beneﬁciary 
committees will need to be included in project schedules and must be costed accordingly. 
At the same time, it is important for municipalities to ensure that housing is delivered on 
time, as this will assist in retaining community interest in the process of participation. It 
is also evident that there is a need for a clear speciﬁcation of the criteria used in the 
selection of beneﬁciaries and for these criteria to be communicated widely (by means of 
public meetings, posters, the media and radio in particular) to communities that might 
include potential beneﬁciaries. Eﬀective communication will also help in managing unrealistic 
demands by poor communities who often have no knowledge of the criteria applied by a 
municipality in selecting beneﬁciaries. 
 
It is also clear that some assessment of the organizational capacity of beneﬁciary 
communities should be undertaken prior to the commencement of a housing project and 
that this should inform the mode of participation pursued. Where it is apparent that 
there is a weak tradition of mobilization among potential housing beneﬁciaries, more 
direct involvement of the municipality is called for in communicating the principles 
guiding the selection process, the type of housing to be constructed, and the time-frames 
for completion of a project. Regular meetings with beneﬁciaries should also assist in 
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1. Some 6000 protests were officially recorded during the 2004/5 financial year 
and an estimated 15 protests were being held per day somewhere in South Africa 
during 2007 (Delaney, 2007). 
2. Research for this article was conducted over a five-month period from November 
2009 to March 2010. Based on a qualitative method, key informant and focus group 
interviews were conducted in each of the ten projects studied. Those interviewed 
included community members, beneficiary committee members, local government 
councillors and relevant municipal officials and project developers. In total, some 60 
people were interviewed. A number of interviews, particular those involving 
beneficiaries, were granted on condition of anonymity. 
3. Municipalities frequently contract out the actual construction of housing to 
private companies, thus adding a further complicating dimension to community 
participation. This is because housing developers are driven by the imperatives of 
time and profit and frequently pay lip service to the need for community 
participation. 
4. Interview, Cupido Jacobs, Project Manager, Project 59, Drakenstein, 2 March 
2010; focus group interview, beneficiary committee representatives, Drakenstein, 9 
March 2010. 
5. Interview, Councillor Teresa Bottoman, Kuyasa, Khayelitsha, 12 February 2010. 
6. Interview, Quintus Wellman, Project Coordinator, Bardale, 17 February, 
2010. 
7. Interview,  Mark  Le  Fleur,  Chairperson  Belhar/Pentech  Housing  Project  
Steering Committee, 10 March 2010, Belhar. 
8. Interview, Edwin Herandien, Pacaltsdorp Project Co-ordinator, George, 30 
November 2009. 
9. Focus group interview, Project 59, Drakenstein, 9 March 2010. 
10. Focus group interview, beneficiary committee members and CLO, Project 59, 
Drakenstein, 9 March 2010. 
11. The reasons for the delays varied but included problems associated with potential 
environmental impact, contested land ownership, planning approval and inadequate 
financial resources among others. 
12. Focus group interview, beneficiary committee representatives, Project 59, 
Drakenstein, 9 March 2010. 
13. Interview, Project developer, Pacaltsdorp, George, 29 November 2009. 
14. Of South Africa’s 11 official languages, Afrikaans and Xhosa predominate among 
poor households in the Province of the Western Cape. 
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